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Comment

I

Trapped in Distress: How the Act 47
Program is Failing Pennsylvania's
Municipalities
Richard L. Armezzani*
Abstract
As of 2014, 19 states have passed fiscal emergency laws to address
financial distress within their municipalities. Among those 19 statutes,
Pennsylvania's Municipalities Financial Recovery Act ("Act 47")
represents one of the most aggressive attempts to cure municipal distress.
Act 47 works by empowering the recovery coordinator, a newly-created
office, to design and implement a fiscal recovery plan for participating
municipalities that includes both cost cutting and new revenue measures.
Since its passage, 28 municipalities have opted to participate in the Act
47 program. Despite Act 47's promise to cure municipal distress, these
participating municipalities have found Act 47 status to be both longlasting and legally controversial.
Legal controversy has specifically involved Section 252 of Act 47,
which limits the enforcement of certain "arbitration settlements." After a
* J.D. Candidate, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State University,
2016. 1 would like to thank my family and friends for their continuous support and
encouragement and my colleagues on the Penn State Law Review for their help
throughout this process. I would also like to acknowledge my hometown and source of
inspiration for this work-Scranton, Pennsylvania.
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series of court decisions, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 2011 's City
of Scranton decision upended precedent and effectively nullified a key
provision of the Act.
Owing to outcry concerning Act 47's
ineffectiveness, the Pennsylvania Legislature has also repeatedly
modified Act 47. Most recently, in 2014, Act 47 was modestly reformed
to include, among other provisions, a participation time limit and new
revenue measures.
Despite both judicial and legislative intervention, the Act 47
program still lacks the tools necessary to successfully aid financially
struggling municipalities. This Comment will argue that both judicial
and legislative interventions have failed because they have not addressed
the roots of municipal distress. Therefore, this Comment will argue for
further legislative reform aimed at remedying several identified causes of
distress. Specifically, this Comment will advocate that reform should
include tax reform for non-profit entities, municipal pension reform, and
regionalization of municipal services.
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I. INTRODUCTION

In many municipalities across Pennsylvania, fiscal distress
complicates governmental operations and threatens entire regions'
economic prosperity. Aimed at restoring fiscal integrity and giving
distressed municipalities a promising future, the Pennsylvania
Municipalities Recovery Act' ("Act 47") is 1 of 19 municipal fiscal
emergency statutes throughout the United States.2 Unlike other fiscal
emergency laws which propose solutions on an ad hoc basis, Act 47
creates a program designed to be a general solution for all participating
municipalities.3
Despite the program's initial promise, Act 47 has largely failed to
restore fiscal integrity for participating municipalities. For example,
since its passage, 28 municipalities have entered the program while only
10 have successfully exited financial distress . Beyond this track record
of ineffectiveness, Act 47 has also resulted in numerous lawsuits
concerning its perceived trampling of municipal public safety unions'
collective bargaining rights. 5 While recent legislative reforms have
attempted to resolve these issues, 6 the program remains ill-equipped to
restore the fiscal integrity of Pennsylvania's municipalities.
This Comment will advocate for further systemic reform of Act 47
and show, through careful analysis of the statute's history, what
successful reform should entail. Part I will provide the statute's
background, including an explanation of its purpose, the criteria for
1.
2.

53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 11701.101 el seq. (West Supp. 2014).
See Eric A. Scorsone, MUNICIPAL FSCAL EMERGENCY LA WS: Background

and Guide to State-BasedApproaches 13 (George Mason Univ. Mercatus Ctr., Working
Paper No. 14-21, 2014), http://mercatus.org/ publication/ municipal-fiscal-emergencylaws-background-and-guide-state-based-approaches
(detailing
various
statewide
programs for addressing municipal financial distress).
3. See id.
4.

See PA. DEP'T OF CMTY. & EcoN. DEv., List of Act 47 Determinations,

http://www.newpa.com/local-govemment/services-we-provide-localgovemments/request-assistance/list-act-47-distress-determinations (last visited Oct. 9,
2014).
5. See infra Part II.D.1.
6. See infra Part II.D.2.
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entering the program, and the increased powers available to
municipalities within the program.7 Part I will also provide a history of
both the legal turmoil surrounding Section 252 of the statute and the
legislative changes up to and including the 2014 reform legislation.8
In Part II, this Comment will discuss the seminal City of Scranton9
decision by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.' ° This discussion is
included not because of the decision's precedential value, but rather for
the majority and dissent's views concerning the policy behind Act 47 and
the dissent's unique insight concerning the effect of legal disputes on the
overall effectiveness of the program. 1
Part II will then analyze
legislative changes made in response12 to the cacophony of discontent
concerning the statute's effectiveness.
Finally, Part III will advocate that further changes be made to
ensure the statute's success at alleviating fiscal distress. The first
recommendation is for legislative change of the tax-exempt status of
non-profit entities operating within distressed municipalities.' 3 The
second recommendation suggests municipal pension reform to address
the danger distressed funds pose for municipalities. 14 The third
recommendation includes a call for regionalization of essential services
to allow for reduced future costs and greater workforce
professionalization.' 5 This change would serve as an effective response
to many distressed municipalities' rapidly decreasing populations. 16
II. BACKGROUND
A. Purpose,Legislative Intent, and Criteriafor Entering the Act 47
Program
The Municipalities Financial Recovery Act,17 more commonly
known as "Act 47," was enacted in 1987 to restore the "fiscal integrity"

7. See infra Parts H.A-C.
8. See infra Parts I.D.1-2.
9. See City of Scranton v. Firefighters Local Union No. 60, of the Int'l Ass'n of
Fire Fighters, 612 Pa. 23, 27 (Pa. 2011).
10. See infra Part III.A.
11. See id
12. See infra Part III.B.
13. See infra Part III.C.1.
14. See infra Part III.C.2.
15. See infra Part III.C.3.
16. See id
17.

53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 11701.101 (West Supp. 2014).
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of Pennsylvania's struggling municipalities. 18
Specifically, upon
passage, the Pennsylvania General Assembly declared that Act 47 would:
(1) "enact procedures and provide powers"'19 for officials to address their
municipality's fiscal crisis within their elected capacity; (2) "enact
procedures for the adjustment of municipal debt"; 20 and (3) "provide for
the exercise of the Commonwealth's sovereign and plenary police
power" 21 in the event local officials fail to adopt an Act 47 recovery plan
to address municipal distress. The motivation behind adopting Act 47
was the steel industry's decline and the ensuing negative effects on the
surrounding municipalities' economies and budgets.22 Act 47 has since
been amended to keep this narrow focus envisioned upon passage. 23
B.

Criteriafor Entering the Act 47 Program

For a municipality to be declared financially distressed and accepted
into the Act 47 program, a party with standing must first request a
determination of distress by the Department of Community and
Economic Development ("the Department"). 24 Act 47 lists ten parties
with standing to request that a municipality be deemed financially
distressed.25 This list includes parties such as the Department itself, the
municipality's governing body, the municipality's chief executive
officer, and, among others, "ten percent of the number of electors..,
that
26
department.,
the
to
petition
by
election,
municipal
voted at the last
Once a determination of financial distress has been requested, the
Department must then discern whether the municipality meets 1 or more
of 11 distress indicators set forth within the Act.27 The factors indicating
18. Id. § 11701.102; see also Drew Patrick Gannon, Comment, An Analysis of
Pennsylvania's Legislative Programsfor FinanciallyDistressed Municipalities and the
Reaction of MunicipalLabor Unions, 98 DICK. L. REv. 281, 281 (1994).
19. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 11701.102(b)(1)(i).
20. Id.§ 11701.102(b)(1)(ii).
21. Id. § 11701.102(b)(1)(iii).
22. See Gannon, supra note 18, at 281.
23. See id For example, Act 47 was amended in 1991 to preclude participation by
the City of Philadelphia.
The General Assembly subsequently developed the
Pennsylvania Intergovernmental Cooperative Authority Act to address Philadelphia's
fiscal woes. For a more thorough explanation of this statute, see 53 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 12720.101 (West Supp. 2014).
24. Although Act 47's original text referenced the Department of Community
Affairs, in 1996, the Pennsylvania General Assembly combined the Departments of
Commerce and Community Affairs to form the Department of Community and Economic
Development. See Act of June 27, 1996 (P.L. 403, No. 58).
25. For an exhaustive list of parties with standing under Act 47, see 53 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 11701.202.
26. Id. § 11701.202(1-10).
27. These factors are:
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distress typically involve the existence of an ongoing budget deficit.

Prime examples include the first factor, which requires that a
municipality has "maintained a deficit over a three year period" and the
second factor which requires that a municipality's "expenditures have
exceeded revenues for a period of three years or more."28 If the
Department determines, based on these 11 indicators, that the
municipality demonstrates significant fiscal distress, it may declare the
municipality "financially distressed" under Act 47.29 To aid in this
determination, the Department is also authorized under Act 47 to
compile financial data on municipalities and, if prompted, to use that
data to determine the existence of "financial distress" or to take proactive
measures to prevent distress for at-risk municipalities.3 °
C.

IncreasedDuties and Powers ofMunicipalities in the Act 47
Program

Once the Department has determined that a municipality is
financially distressed, it has 30 days to appoint a "recovery coordinator"
for the municipality. 31 The coordinator must be an employee of either
(1) The municipality has maintained a deficit over a three year period, with a
deficit of 1% or more in each of the previous fiscal years;(2) The
municipality's expenditures have exceeded revenues for a period of three years
or more; (3) The municipality has defaulted in payment of principal or interest
on any of its bonds or notes or in payment of rentals due any authority; (4) The
municipality has missed a payroll for 30 days; (5) The municipality has failed
to make required payments to judgment creditors for 30 days beyond the date
of the recording of the judgment; (6) The municipality, for a period of at least
30 days beyond the due date, has failed to forward taxes withheld on the
income of employees or has failed to transfer employer or employee
contributions for Social Security; (7) The municipality has accumulated and has
operated for each of two successive years a deficit equal to 5% or more of its
revenues; (8) The municipality has failed to make the budgeted payment of its
minimum municipal obligation as required by... the Municipal Pension Plan
Funding Standard and Recovery Act, with respect to a pension fund during the
fiscal year for which payment was budgeted and has failed to take action within
that time period to make required payments; (9) The municipality has sought to
negotiate resolution or adjustment of a claim in excess of 30% against a fund or
budget and has failed to reach an agreement with creditors; (10) The
municipality has filed a municipal debt readjustment plan pursuant to Chapter 9
of the Bankruptcy Code; (11) The municipality has experienced a decrease in a
quantified level of municipal service from the preceding fiscal year which has
resulted from the municipality reaching its legal limit in levying real estate
taxes for general purposes.
Id.§ 11701.201.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. See 53 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 11701.121(a) (setting forth the duties of the
Department in the Act 47 program).
31. Id. § 11701.221(a).
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the Department or an outside consulting firm and cannot be an elected
official within the municipality.3 2 Once appointed, this coordinator's
primary duty is to prepare a recovery plan containing both cost-cutting
measures and new revenue measures capable of alleviating the
municipality's financial distress.3 3 The recovery plan is then submitted
to the municipal governing body, and once approved, it is the
coordinator's responsibility to oversee its successful implementation.34
If the governing body of a municipality operating under a home rule
charter or optional form of government refuses to pass the coordinatorproduced recovery plan, Act 47 requires that the municipality's chief
executive officer ("CEO") produce a recovery plan within 14 days.35
Likewise, the CEO is similarly tasked with producing an acceptable
recovery plan within 14 days if the CEO refuses to implement a
coordinator-produced recovery plan accepted by the municipal governing
body.36 When municipalities are not operating under a home rule charter
or optional form of government, the municipal governing body is tasked
with producing its own recovery plan within 14 days of the coordinatorproduced plan's rejection.37
If the Secretary of the Department
concludes that this alternate plan adequately addresses the municipality's
financial distress, the alternate plan can then be adopted by ordinance
and implemented by either the CEO or municipal governing body.38 As
an incentive to actively participate in the program, Act 47 provides for
the withholding of Commonwealth funds if a municipality fails to either
adopt the coordinator's plan or produce an alternate plan within the
aforementioned timetable.39
Available for use in either a coordinator-crafted recovery plan or a
CEO-crafted recovery plan is a special taxing power allowable only to
municipalities participating in the Act 47 program. 40 For example, the
Act includes a provision permitting the distressed municipality to
petition the Court of Common Pleas 4 1 for authorization to increase real
32. Id. § 11701.221(b).
33. Id. § 11701.221(d).
34. Id.
35. Id. § 11701.246(a).
36. Id.§ 11701.246(a).
37. Id.
38. In cases in which the recovery plan was not crafted by a coordinator, the plan is
implemented by its author, i.e., the municipal CEO or governing body in a non-optimal
form of government. See id. §§ 11701.247(b)-(c).
39. Id. §§ 11701.251, 11701.264 (specifying in both sections that municipalities
which fail to adopt a recovery plan face the withholding of grants, loans, or other
Commonwealth payments not specifically excluded from these sections).
40. See id. § 11701.123.
41. In the Pennsylvania state judicial system, the Courts of Common Pleas are the
general trial courts typically organized by county. For more information, see Learn,
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estate or earned income tax rates beyond the state maximum. 42 Although
this increase is only effective for a year, the city is not prevented from
seeking continued yearly authorizations from the local Court of Common
Pleas.43
In the event that the coordinator or city leaders determine the tax
burden imposed on city residents has become excessive under the plan,
the Act authorizes them to levy a commuter tax on non-residents
working within the city.44
Although seemingly helpful towards
spreading the burden of tax increases, this option of levying a commuter
tax is not without limitations. For example, the "second-class-A ' 45 city
of Scranton is prohibited under Act 47 from imposing a commuter tax
unless: (1) the municipality has already increased tax rates for residents,
(2) other provisions allowed within the Act have been implemented first,
and (3) the additional income derived from the implementation of other
tax increases has been insufficient to balance the municipal budget.46
Beyond establishing the increased taxing power outlined above, Act 47
also provides that the recovery coordinator may request additional grants
and emergency interest-free loans from the state.4 7
D. History ofAct 47
1. Court Battles Over Section 252 of Act 47
Since Act 47's passage in 1987 and its subsequent adoption by
various municipalities, Section 252 of the Act has proven controversial
for limiting the collective bargaining rights of public safety unions.48
Section 252 specifically provides that no arbitration settlements or
agreements can "violate, expand or diminish" the provisions of a

http://www.pacourts .us/learn/ (last visited
Nov. 7, 2014).
42. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 11701.123(c)(1).
43. Id. § 11701.123(c)(2).
44. Id. § 11701.123(c)(3).
45. In Pennsylvania, cities are separated into four classes corresponding primarily to
their population. Currently, the only city with "second class-A" designation is Scranton.
Therefore, this provision specifically limits that city's power to levy a commuter tax. See
David Singleton, Scranton Classification Change Could Have Ripple Effect, TIMESTRIBUNE (May 5, 2012), http://thetimes-tribune.com/news/scranton-classification-changecould-have-ripple-effect- 1.1310968.
46. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1 1701.123(c)(3)(i)-(iii).
47. Id.§§ 11701.301-303.
48. See generally 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 11701.252 (West Supp. 2014); Alaina
C. Schroeder, Comment, The Interplay Between the MunicipalitiesFinancialRecovery
Act and the Policemen and Firemen Collective BargainingAct: An Analysis of City of
Scranton v. FireFightersLocal Union No. 60, 19 WIDENER L.J. 541 (2010).
UNIFIED JUDICIAL SYSTEM OF PENNSYLVANIA,
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previously adopted recovery plan.49 In a myriad of court cases filed
since Act 47's passage, public safety unions have argued that Section
252 violates the Policemen and Firemen Collective Bargaining Act("Act
1lll"),5° which provides for binding arbitration in the event of a
negotiation impasse between a public employer and a police or
firefighters union.5
a. Development of Court Precedent
This issue concerning the interplay between Act 47 and Act 111
was first litigated in Wilkinsburg Police Officers Ass 'n v.
In this suit, the Wilkinsburg Police Officers'
Commonwealth.52
Association sought a declaratory judgment that Act 47's conflict with
Act 111 was in violation of the Pennsylvania Constitution's guarantee of
collective bargaining rights for police and fire associations.53 The
Commonwealth Court 54 held that, although Act 111 was passed pursuant
to Article III Section 31 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which
concerned the passage of laws providing for public safety unions'
collective bargaining rights, the General Assembly was also authorized
to pass laws "limit[ing] police officers' statutory rights to collective
bargaining., 55 On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the
Commonwealth Court's finding and further stated that "even if section
252 of Act 47 operates as a bar to prospective bargaining agreements," it
would still not violate Article III, Section 31 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution.56
A year later in City of Farrellv. FraternalOrder of Police, Lodge
No. 34,57 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered whether a police
union's arbitration award, reached by a board of arbitration after the city

49.
50.
51.

53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 11701.252(a).
43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 217.4 (West 2011).
See id.

52. Wilkinsburg Police Officers Ass'n v. Commonwealth (Wilkinsburg 1), 564 A.2d
1015, 1020 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989), aff'd, Wilkinsburg Police Officers Ass'n v.
Commonwealth (Wilkinsburg 1), 636 A.2d 134 (Pa. 1993).
53. See Wilkinsburg 1, 564 A.2d at 1020; see also PA. CONST. art. III, § 31
(providing that the "General Assembly may enact laws... for collective bargaining
between policemen and firemen and their public employers [that] shall be binding upon
all parties").
54. In the Pennsylvania state judicial system, the Commonwealth Court is one of
two intermediary appellate courts. It is "primarily responsible for matters involving state
and local governments and regulatory agencies." For more information, see UNIFIED
JUDICIAL SYSTEM OF PENNSYLVANIA, supra note 41.
55. Wilkinsburgl, 564 A.2d at 1020.
56. WilkinsburglI, 636 A.2d at 140.
57. City of Farrell v. Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 34, 645 A.2d 1294 (Pa.
1994).
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and police union failed to ratify a new collective bargaining agreement,
violated the city's Act 47 recovery plan. 58 Because the City of Farrell
had been designated as "financially distressed" under Act 47, the city
sought a declaratory judgment that the arbitration award contained
provisions that violated the previously adopted recovery plan and, thus,
could not be enforced. 59 The Supreme Court held, however, that
although the arbitration award was determined post-recovery plan, the
salary increases did not conflict with the plan's provisions. 60 Therefore,
despite a factual disagreement with the Commonwealth Court concerning
whether salary increases violated the recovery plan, the Supreme Court
implicitly affirmed the Commonwealth Court's finding that Section 252
would prohibit "any arbitration award executed after the adoption of a
recovery plan... which violate[s], expand[s], or diminish[es] any
provisions of the plan. 61
Based on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's holdings in both
Wilkinsburg and City of Farrell, the Commonwealth Court held in
decisions from 2005 through 2010 that Section 252 of Act 47 applies to
both arbitration "settlements" and "determinations. 62 The Court reached
this conclusion repeatedly despite the absence of the term
"determination" within the definitions section of the Act. 63 In Pittsburgh
FireFighters,Local No. 1 v. Yablonsky,64 the Commonwealth Court held
that, even though Section 252 of Act 47 did not specifically reference
arbitration determinations, the General Assembly, "in referring to
collective bargaining agreements or arbitration settlements in Act 47,
was referring to arbitration awards, whether it used the word settlement
or determination. 65 Similarly, in Int'l Ass 'n of FirefightersLocal 1400,
Chester City Firefightersv. City of Chester,66 the Commonwealth Court
again held that Section 252 of Act 47 applies to arbitration awards as
well as to settlements and collective bargaining agreements.67 Despite
court precedent concerning the breadth of Section 252, the Act 47 City of
58. Id.at 1295-96.
59. Id.at 1295.
60. Id.at 1299.
61. Id.at 1297 (quoting the finding of the Commonwealth Court and basing the
subsequent factual determination on that premise).
62. See, e.g., Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters Local 1400, Chester City Firefighters v. City
of Chester, 991 A.2d 1001, 1010 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2010); Pittsburgh Fire Fighters, Local
No. 1 v. Yablonsky, 867 A.2d 666, 671 (Pa. Commnw. Ct. 2005).
63. See Chester City Firefighters, 991 A.2d at 1010; Yablonsky, 867 A.2d at 671.
64. Pittsburgh Fire Fighters, Local No. 1 v. Yablonsky, 867 A.2d 666 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 2005).
65. Id. at 671.
66. Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters Local 1400, Chester City Firefighters v. City of
Chester, 991 A.2d 1001 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2010).
67. Id. at 1010.
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Scranton's public safety unions appealed, in 2009, an adverse
Commonwealth Court decision 68 and argued that Section 252 does not
apply to arbitration awards.
b. City of Scranton and Aftermath
Just when Pennsylvania courts appeared to have settled on a broad
interpretation of Section 252, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upended
that interpretation in favor of a much narrower view.69

In City of

Scranton v. FirefightersLocal Union No. 60, of the Int'l Ass'n of Fire
Fighters,70 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that Section 252 of Act
47 did not apply to "interest arbitration awards under Pennsylvania's
Policemen and Firemen Collective Bargaining Act," which were reached
following the adoption of a recovery plan.71
In doing so, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the Commonwealth Court, which
had upheld the trial court's vacation of the award.72
In its opinion, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reasoned that prior
court opinions in Wilkinsburg and City of Farrellwere not controlling as
to whether Section 252 applied to "arbitration awards." 73

In support

thereof, the Court reasoned that these prior holdings were based on an
assumption that Section 252 applied to arbitration awards and not a
"binding holding grounded on developed reasoning., 74 Without binding
precedent, the Court determined, after referencing both MerriamWebster Dictionary and Black's Law Dictionary, that Section 252's
language concerning "arbitration settlements" was "sufficiently75
ambiguous to warrant reference to tools of statutory construction.,
Specifically, the court considered "the occasion and necessity for the
statute; the object to be attained by the enactment under review; the
consequences of specific interpretations; and the manner in which the
Legislature would have likely intended for Act 47 to interact with Act
111" in order to best determine the legislature's intent concerning the
interplay between Acts 47 and 111.76

68. See generally City of Scranton v. Firefighters Local Union No. 60, of the Int'l
Ass'n of Fire Fighters, 964 A.2d 464 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2009), rev'd, 612 Pa. 23, 27 (Pa.
2011).
69. See City of Scranton v. Firefighters Local Union No. 60, of the Int'l Ass'n of
Fire Fighters, 612 Pa. 23, 27 (Pa. 2011).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 50.
72. See id. at 34-35.
73. See id. at 44.
74. City of Scranton, 612 Pa. at 45.
75. Id. at 46.
76. Id. at 46-47.
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Through this consideration, the Court found that Act 1 ll's
underlying purpose of preventing labor strife outweighed the public
policy of Act 47, namely curing municipal financial distress. 77 In fact,
the Court stated that the "great difficulty arising between the City [of
Scranton] and the Unions in accepting each other's good faith"
demonstrates the exact circumstances that motivated the Pennsylvania
Legislature to initially pass Act 111.78 With the Court now resolved that
the public policy underlying Act 111 trumped the public policy
underlying Act 47, it distinguished the Yablonsky finding that "the
General Assembly... was referring to arbitration awards, whether it
used the word settlement or determination. 79 Specifically, the Court
reasoned that the Yablonsky rationale "rest[ed] more on the notion that
Section 252 must extend to arbitration awards to vindicate Act 47's
policy objectives than upon a textual evaluation... ,,80 Therefore,
because the Court had previously reached an opposite conclusion
concerning the weighing of public policy, it attributed no weight to
Yablonsky's finding and held that "Section 252 of Act 47 does not
impinge upon interest arbitration 81awards under the Policemen and
Firemen Collective Bargaining Act.",
Despite this ruling's sweeping nature, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court was not finished reversing Commonwealth Court precedent
concerning Act 47. 82 Four months later, in City of Scranton v. E.B.
Jermyn Lodge of No. 2 of FraternalOrder of Police,83 the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court again vacated the Commonwealth Court's holding and
issued an order in favor of the union appellant based on a similar dispute
84
concerning arbitration awards for the Scranton police officer's union.
The aftermath of these decisions devastated the City of Scranton's
finances.85 Saddled with a $30 million arbitration award for both the
police and fire unions, the city has struggled to secure funding to pay the
award and, as a result, has seen its financial situation further
77. See id.
78. Id.at 47.
79. See City of Scranton, 612 Pa. 23 at 48 (citing Pittsburgh Fire Fighters, Local No.
1 v. Yablonsky, 867 A.2d 666, 671 (Pa. Cornmw. Ct. 2005).
80. See id.
81. Seeid. at50.
82. See generally City of Scranton v. E.B. Jermyn Lodge of No. 2 of Fraternal Order
of Police, 614 Pa. 457 (Pa. 2012).
83. City of Scranton v. E.B. Jermyn Lodge of No. 2 of Fraternal Order of Police, 614
Pa. 457 (Pa. 2012).
84. Id.at 458.
85. See generally Romy Varghese, Scranton Strains Under Pennsylvania Ruling
Cutting Fiscal Repair Measure, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 13, 2012, 12:01 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com
/news/2012-02-13/pennsylvania-s-scranton-strains-underruling-cutting-fiscal-repair-measure.html.
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deteriorate.8 6 Fearing other ill-effects likely to result from the City of
Scranton decisions, the Pennsylvania General Assembly quickly
amended the definitions section of Act 47 to specify that the term
"arbitration settlement" explicitly includes a "final or binding arbitration
award or determination., 87 This amendment would be the first in a series
of amendments to improve Act 47's effectiveness.88
2. Legislative Changes to Act 47
Even before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's City of Scranton
decisions devastated Scranton's finances, there was reason to question
Act 47's overall effectiveness. 89 Since its passage in 1987, 28
municipalities have entered the program, but only 10 have successfully
exited financial distress. 90 Despite this modest success for a limited
number of participants, the program's overall record is poor, and the
Pennsylvania Legislature has responded by making largely piecemeal
and reactionary modifications. 91
a. Early Legislative Changes
The first major modification of the Act 47 program occurred in
1996, when the General Assembly added a three-pronged test for
"second class-A" cities wishing to impose a commuter tax. 92 This
modification was a response to the unsuccessful and controversial
attempt by Scranton, as the only "second class-A" city in the state, to
institute a commuter tax.93 This section's restriction, passed as result of

86. See id.; Terrie Morgan-Besecker, Scranton Pension Funds Will Be Broke in 3 to
5 Years, TIMES-TRIBUNE (Aug. 28, 2014), http://thetimes-tribune.com/news/scrantonpension-funds-will-be-broke-in-3-to-5-years-1.1742563
(explaining that
Scranton
pension funds' insolvency was exacerbated by the arbitration award of 2011).
87. See 2011 Pa. SB 1321 (amending Section 103 of Act 47 to specifically include
"arbitration award or other determination" within the definition of "arbitration
settlement"); Melissa Daniels, Bill to Clarify Act 47 Moving Through Pennsylvania
Senate, PA INDEPENDENT (May 29, 2012), http://paindependent.com/2012/05/bill-toclarify-act-47-arbitration-moving-through-pennsylvania-senate/ (quoting Senate Majority
Leader Pileggi that amendment was essential because the City of Scranton decision
"effectively gutted the Act 47 statute").
88. See infra Parts II.D.2.a-b.
89. See Schroeder, supra note 48, at 551-53 (questioning Act 47's effectiveness
considering the pre-City of Scranton burdens it placed on public safety unions and the
program's lack of success in alleviating distress).
90. See List ofAct 47 Detenninations,supra note 4.
91. See Gary Lewis, An introduction to Act 47, Pennsylvania's "roach motel"for
distressed cities, PUBLICSECTORINC.ORG (Dec. 3, 2013), http://www.publicsectorinc
.org/2013/12/an-introduction-to-act-47-pennsylvanias-roach-motel-for-distressed-cities.
92. See Act ofJuly 11, 1996 (P.L. 645, No. 108); Lewis, supra note 91.
93. See id.
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efforts, remains applicable only to the City of
local legislators'
94
Scranton.
The next modification of Act 47 occurred in response to the City of
Harrisburg's descent into municipal distress. 95 Because of Harrisburg's
unwillingness to adopt a recovery plan under the Act 47 program, the
General Assembly moved in 2011 to amend the Act to provide for the
appointment of a receiver in the event of a fiscal emergency. 96 This
amendment, applied quickly in the City of Harrisburg, allows for the
governor to declare a "fiscal emergency" if the distressed municipality
has failed to adopt a recovery plan and faces insolvency within a period
of 180 days.97
Once a fiscal emergency is declared, the amendment further allows
the governor to, among other powers, "obtain emergency financial aid
for the distressed city," 98 "modify the emergency action plan," 99 and
"issue an order ... to implement the emergency action plan."'100
Furthermore, the amendment also allows the Secretary of the Department
to appoint a receiver who is tasked with: (1) implementing the
emergency action plan; (2) developing a permanent recovery plan; and
(3) executing that recovery plan. 10'Passed with the City of Harrisburg in
mind, receivership was formally instituted there in November 201 1.102
After more than two years under state control, Harrisburg formally exited
receivership on March 1, 2014, but is currently participating in the Act
47 program. 103

94. See id
95. See Romy Varghese, et al., Harrisburg Files for Bankruptcy on Overdue
PM),
2011
2:14
(Oct.
12,
Debt,
BLOOMBERG
Incinerator
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/201 1-10-12/pennsylvania-capital-harrisburg-files-forbankruptcy-over-incinerator-debt.html.

96. See Act of October 20, 2011 (P.L. 318, No. 79);

LOCAL Gov'T COMM'N, GEN.

2013 TASK FORCE REPORT ON ACT 47 OF
2013),
1987, MUNICIPALITIES FINANCIAL RECOVERY ACT 16 (Oct. 16,
download.cfm?file=/Reports/act47/101713/Act%2047-ofhttp://www.lgc.state.pa.us/
1987-2013-Task-Force-Report-FINAL-10-16-2013.pdf; Laura Vecsey, Sen. Jeff Piccola
Amends Bill that Would Allow State to Take Qver Harrisburg,PENNLIVE.COM (updated
http://www.pennlive.com/nidstate/index.ssf/2011
2011, 7:39 PM),
June 21,
/06/senjeff piccolaamends-bill-t.html.
97. See 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 11701.702(a)(West Supp. 2014).
98. Id. § 11701.604(a)(2).
99. Id. § 11701.604(a)(4).
100. Id.§ 11701.604(b).
101. Id.§ 11701.702(a).
102. See Sean Simmers, Court Order Ends Harrisburg'sState Receivership Saturday,
AM),
9:12
26,
2014,
(updated
Feb.
PENNLIVE.COM
http://www.pennlive.com/midstate/index.ssf
/2014/02/judgeorders cityreceivership.html.
103. Id.
ASSEMBLY OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PA.,

2015]

TRAPPED IN DISTRESS: HOW THE ACT 47 PROGRAM IS FAILING

605

b. 2014 Reform
Despite Harrisburg's success in exiting Act 47's new receivership
provision, it and other cities still languish in the broader Act 47
program. °4 Recently, the movement to further reform Act 47 has gained
momentum and, in fact, Governor Tom Corbett signed a reform bill into
law on October 31, 2014.105 This reform bill was passed with the added
legislative intent of "enact[ing] procedures to provide municipalities
showing early indications of financial distress with training and technical
and financial assistance.' ' 6 The bill contained the foregoing modest
reforms to accomplish this legislative intent.
1. The Early Intervention Program
To provide at-risk municipalities with training and technical
assistance, the 2014 Act 47 reform legislation created "The Early
Intervention Program," which has the stated goal of "provid[ing]
guidance and assistance through grants to a municipality seeking to
ensure fiscal stability by developing and implementing long-term
financial, managerial and economic development strategies.' ' 7 Seeking
to prevent financial distress in at-risk municipalities, the grants awarded
are limited to funding activities or studies thought to achieve that goal,
such as the development of "multi-municipal or regional
intergovernmental cooperation initiatives" and, among other programs,
the completion of "a merger or consolidation study. ' 10 8 Acceptance into
the Early Intervention Program is based on factors which evaluate both a
municipality's future fiscal health and its willingness to accept the
management expertise provided through the program. 109
2. Participation Time Limit
Apart from establishing the Early Intervention Program for at-risk
municipalities, the 2014 reform legislation also made modest changes

104. Municipalities still participating in the program include Pittsburgh, Reading,
Scranton, and Harrisburg, or the state's second, fifth, sixth, and ninth most populous
cities, respectively. See List of Act 47 Determinations,supra note 4.
105.

See Robert Swift, Distressed Cities Law Stresses ProactiveRole, TIMES-TRIBUNE

(Nov. 4, 2014), http://thetimes-tribune.com/news/distressed-cities-law-stresses-proactiverole- 1.1782425.
106. See H.B. 1773, 198th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2014).
107.

See id.

108. See id.
109. For an exhaustive list of factors for evaluating a municipality's eligibility for the
Early Intervention program, see H.B. 1773, 198th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2014).
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that affect municipalities already participating in the Act 47 program. 1 °
The most significant reform has been imposing a five-year time limit on
Act 47 participation.'1 1 At the beginning of the final year within the
program, the coordinator is tasked with completing a report detailing the
municipality's financial condition.' 12 Within the report, the coordinator
must recommend one of four options based on financial conditions: (1)
the termination of distressed status;1 13 (2) the disincorporation of the
municipality; (3) the imposition of a fiscal emergency; or (4) the creation
of a three-year exit plan from the Act 47 program.11 4 After this five-year
term, participating municipalities would be eligible for a single threeyear extension. 1 5 If, however, the municipality is still financially
distressed after the three-year exit plan, a fiscal emergency under Section
7 of the Act would be declared with the municipality facing possible
state receivership.116
3. New Tax Options
The 2014 Act 47 reform legislation also created modest new tax
options for distressed municipalities.' 7 For example, under the 2014
reforms, distressed municipalities can now collect a Local Services
Tax 118 at a maximum rate of $156.119 This triples the initial maximum of
$52 dollars. 120 This tripling of the tax rate, however, comes with an
important restriction. Any municipality that increases the Local Services
Tax by ordinance is prohibited "from imposing any additional tax on
110.
MIRROR

See generally William Kibler, Leaders split on amendments to Act 47, ALTOONA
(Nov.
9,
2014),

http://www.altoonamirror.com/page/content.detail/id/597796/Leaders-split-onamendments-to-Act-47.html?nav=742.
111. See H.B. 1773, 198th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2014).
112. See id.
113. The 2014 reforms also create a procedure for and factors to be considered in the
termination of a municipality's distressed status. For an exhaustive list of these factors,
see H.B. 1773, 198th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2014).
114. See H.B. 1773, 198th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2014).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. See generally Robert Swift, Tax could triple under Act 47 plan, TIMES-TRIBUNE
(June 19, 2014), http://thetimes-tribune.com/news/tax-could-triple-under-act-47-plan1.1705643.
118. See H.B. 1773, 198th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2014).
119. The Local Services Tax is "a local tax payable by all individuals who hold a job
or profession within a taxing jurisdiction imposing the tax." See Local Services Tax
(LST-1)." Frequently Asked Questions, BERKHEIMER
TAX
ADMINISTRATOR,
http://www.hab-inc.com/faqs/employer-local-services-tax-faq
(last visited Nov. 10,
2014).
120.

See 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6924.311(8)(West Supp. 2014)(limiting the

maximum local services tax rate for non-distressed municipalities to $52 dollars per
year).
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earned income. ' ' 121 Furthermore, a municipality that imposes an earned
22 is
income tax on residents and non-residents working within the city
1 23
year.
restricted from levying a Local Services Tax above $104 per
Another taxing option included within the 2014 reform legislation is
the imposition of a Payroll Preparation Tax pursuant to approval by the
local Court of Common Pleas. 124 The proceeds of this new taxing power
are limited, however, to "a rate that is sufficient to produce revenues
equal to revenues collected as a result of a business privilege tax and a
mercantile tax."' 125 Therefore, if a distressed municipality petitions the
Court of Common Pleas for authority to impose such a tax, it would
a mercantile
sacrifice the authority to levy a business privilege tax 1and
26
revenue.
increased
net
to
fail
result,
a
tax, and would, as
4. Increased Coordinator Accountability
The 2014 reforms also increased the recovery coordinator's
accountability to its appointed municipality and created a process for
Specifically, the reform
dismissing ineffective coordinators. 127
legislation states that the Secretary of the Department is to conduct an
annual review of all coordinators to determine if they are complying with
both their recovery contract and Act 47 and if they have been effective in
providing assistance in creating and implementing a recovery plan. 128 If
in either area, the
the Secretary of the Department finds a 2deficiency
9
coordinator's contract may be terminated. 1
III. ANALYSIS: THE CITY OF SCRANTON DECISION, 2014 REFORM, AND A
RECOMMENDATION FOR FURTHER REFORM OF ACT 47

As evidenced by the previously discussed court cases, legislative
reforms, and large number of municipalities languishing within the
program, Act 47 has proven controversial because of its perceived
conflict with public safety unions' collective bargaining rights and its
lackluster record of actually curing municipal distress. Starting with the
121. See H.B. 1773, 198th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2014).
122. Under the Municipal Pension Plan Funding Standard and Recovery Act ("Act
205"), a financially distressed municipality with a level II or level III distressed pension
plan is authorized to impose an earned income tax rate on both residents and nonresidents above the state maximum with proceeds strictly for the benefit of municipal
pension plans. See 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 895.607(f)(West Supp. 2014).
123. See H.B. 1773, 198th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2014).
124. See id.
125. Id.
126. See id.
127. See H.B. 1773, 198th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2014).
128. See id.
129. See id.
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seminal City of Scranton decision, the movement to strengthen Act 47
has gained momentum; however, as the decision itself demonstrates, any
reform must address the underlying causes of municipal distress. This
analysis will argue that reform thus far has failed to address these causes
and further legislative action is needed to truly alleviate municipal
distress.
A. The City of Scranton Decision and Its Significance
In the litany of cases dating from Act 47's initial passage, both the
Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court and the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court have grappled with legal issues concerning Section 252 of Act 47
and whether the term "arbitration settlement" is included within Section
252.130 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court resolved the issue of Section
31
Furthermore, as
252's constitutionality early on, in Wilkinsburg.1
described above, the courts also found that Section 252 of Act 47 limited
both "arbitration settlements" and "arbitration determinations" in the
form of an arbitration award. 13 2 In 201 I's City of Scranton decision, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court backpedaled on this precedent and held that
Section 252's limitation on public safety unions' collective bargaining
rights does not include arbitration "determinations
or awards" which
33
violate a previously adopted recovery plan.1
1. Analysis of the Majority Opinion
As previously discussed, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in the
City of Scranton decision reasoned that prior Supreme Court opinions in
City of Farrelland Wilkinsburg were not controlling as to whether the
term "arbitration settlement" within Section 252 applied to "arbitration
awards. 134 Placed within a footnote to the court's opinion, however, is
the majority's recognition that the City of Farrellcourt had reached its
holding based on an agreement with the Commonwealth Court that
"[S]ection 252 of Act 47 prohibits [a recovery plan] from being violated,

130. See generally City of Farrell v. Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 34, 645
A.2d 1294 (Pa. 1994); Wilkinsburg Police Officers Ass'n v. Commonwealth
(Wilkinsburg 11), 636 A.2d 134 (Pa. 1993); Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters Local 1400,
Chester City Firefighters v. City of Chester, 991 A.2d 1001 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2010);
Pittsburgh Fire Fighters, Local No. 1 v. Yablonsky, 867 A.2d 666 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2005).
131. See Wilkinsburgl,636A.2dat 139.
132. Id.
133. See City of Scranton v. Firefighters Local Union No. 60, of the Int'l Ass'n of
Fire Fighters, 612 Pa. 23, 27 (Pa. 2011).
134. See supra Part II.D.1.b.
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expanded or diminished by [an] arbitration award."' 3 5 Therefore,
although the court in City of Scranton reasoned that the City of Farrell
holding was limited to whether the arbitration award violated Farrell's
recovery plan, this holding was based on the court's acceptance of the
Commonwealth Court's conclusion that Section 252 prohibited an
from violating the provisions of a previously adopted
arbitration award
36
plan.1
recovery
Furthermore, within that same footnote, the majority in City of
Scranton quotes the court in City of Farrell as stating that the
determination of whether the arbitration award violated the recovery plan
represented "the end of the inquiry."' 137 Although the court in City of
Farrell had stated that its inquiry only extended to whether the
arbitration award violated the provisions of the previously adopted
recovery plan, closer inspection of the opinion shows that the court was
not excluding from its inquiry whether Section 252 of Act 47 included
arbitration awards, as the court in City of Scranton suggests. The court
was instead choosing not to review the Commonwealth Court's inquiry
as to "whether the arbitration award substituted the discretion of the
arbitrators for that of Farrell's elected officials under Act 47 in
establishing the priorities in the application of available revenues. ' 38 In
fact, as previously discussed, the court in City of Farrell had already
accepted the finding of the Commonwealth Court that Section 252
arbitration awards in violation of previously adopted recovery
disallowed
139
plans.
Because the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in City of Scranton did
not find controlling precedent on the issue of arbitration awards, it
instead conducted a plain-meaning analysis of the term "arbitration
settlement.' 140 As previously discussed, the Court found the term to be
"sufficiently ambiguous" and moved to determine the legislative intent
concerning the interplay between Acts 47 and 111.141 Finding that Act
111 's purpose of preventing labor strife outweighed the policy of aiding
distressed municipalities, the majority, as described above, 142 settled on

135.
No. 34
136.
137.
1299).
138.
139.
No. 34
140.
141.
142.

See City of Farrell,645 A.2d at 1297 (quoting Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge
v. City of Farrell, 590 A.2d 1327, 1332 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991)).
See id.
See City of Scranton, 612 Pa. at 46 n.21 (quoting City of Farrell,645 A.2d at
See City of Farrell,645 A.2d at 1297, 1299.
See City of Farrell,645 A.2d at 1297 (quoting Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge
v. City of Farrell, 590 A.2d 1327, 1332 (Pa. Comnw. Ct. 1991)).
See City ofScranton, 612 Pa. at 46.
See supra Part II.D.l.b.
See supra Part II.D. 1.b.
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an interpretation of Act 47 which devastated Scranton's finances and
increased concerns over Act 47's effectiveness.
2. Analysis of the Dissent
Although the City of Scranton majority had offered a forceful
argument that public policy favored excluding "arbitration awards" from
Act 47's reach, Judge Castille's dissent offered a compelling counterargument concerning the importance of municipal financial stability.14 3
This counter-argument provided perspective on the ongoing labor
disputes' effect on the citizens and other stakeholders within distressed
municipalities. 1" Like the majority, the dissent first found the term
"arbitration settlement" to be ambiguous; however, when viewed as
shorthand for the phrase "the settlement of disputes by arbitration," the
dissent argued that the plain meaning of the term would naturally
encompass arbitration awards which serve
to "accomplish an adjustment
' 45
or settlement of grievances or disputes.'
Beyond disagreeing over the plain meaning of "arbitration
settlement," the dissent also argued persuasively that the public policy
behind Act 111 does not outweigh the goals of Act 47. 146 Specifically,
the dissent argued that, because Act 47's purpose is to alleviate fiscal
distress and prevent it from "adversely affect[ing] the health, safety, and
welfare of citizens in the municipality," the curtailment of personnel
costs, as provided for in Section 252, is a necessary means of fulfilling
that purpose. 147 Furthermore, while the dissent recognized Act I l's
important function of "maintaining the historic balance between labor
and municipal employers," it also rightly acknowledged that in times of
municipal distress when labor disputes become particularly common, the
majority's interpretation of Section 252 would be counterintuitive
because it would allow "both labor and the municipality to continue with
business as usual.' 48
Finally, the dissent spoke to both the significance of this particular
dispute with organized labor and the need for Act 47 to address the
causes of distress in order to achieve success for its participants.1 49 As
previously discussed, the dissent first underscored the need for
comprehensively redressing escalating personnel costs to alleviate

143. See generally City of Scranton, 612 Pa. at 51 (Castille, J., dissenting).
144. See id.
145. Id. at 53.
146. See generally id.
147. Id. at 54.
148. See City of Scranton, 612 Pa. at 54 (Castille, J., dissenting).
149. See id. at 55.
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financial distress.15 0 The dissent also rightly recognized, however, that
this legal dispute with organized labor is a battle that, regardless of the
victor, produces a result that "increase[s] the financial burden on other
municipal stakeholders."''51 As evidenced in the 2014 reforms, those
stakeholders facing an "increased burden" are both residents and nonresidents working within the city who have already sacrificed for their
municipality. 15 2
Therefore, if Act 47 intends to "involve all
stakeholders... to ensure the financial well-being of a municipality" as
the dissent argues,'I 3 then reform needs to "enlarge the pie" of those
making sacrifices and address the underlying causes of distress.
B. 2014 Legislative Reforms and Their Significance
In response to the City of Scranton decision, the Pennsylvania
Legislature quickly amended the definition of "arbitration settlement"
within Section 252 to include "final or binding arbitration award[s] or
other determination[s].' 54 Despite this change and the creation of a
provision in 2012 for state receivership,' 55 calls for comprehensive Act
47 reform grew louder as municipalities continued to struggle within the
program.1 56 In response, the Pennsylvania Legislature enacted the 2014
reform bill, which imposes a participation deadline, ensures greater
coordinator accountability, includes new but limited taxing powers,
and
57
municipalities.
at-risk
for
program
intervention
early
an
creates
1. Analysis of the New Time Limit on Act 47 Participation
The most promising 2014 reform is the imposition of a participation
time limit in the Act 47 program. Enacted upon the recommendation of
the Municipalities Financial Recovery Act 2013 Task Force Report, 58
150. See id.
151. See id.
152. As previously discussed, the subsequent 2014 reforms of Act 47 include tripling
the Local Services Tax affecting commuters. See Swift, supra note 117.
153. See City of Scranton, 612 Pa. at 55 (Castille, J., dissenting).
154. See 2011 Pa. SB 1321 (amending Section 103 of Act 47 to specifically include
"arbitration award or other determination" within the definition of "arbitration
settlement").
155. See Act of October 20, 2011 (P.L. 318, No. 79).
156. See Emily Previti, How does Pennsylvania'sdistressedcommunities law (Act
47) work?, KEYSTONE CROSSROADS (June 24, 2014), http://crossroads.newsworks.org
/index.php /localikeystone-crossroads/69588-how-does-pennsylvanias-distressedcommunities-law-act-47-work (explaining that, as of June 24, 2014, "[tlhe Act 47 success
rate ... is 25 percent (seven of 28)").

157. See H.B. 1773, 198th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa 2014). For a full explanation
of 2014's reforms, see supra Part II.D.2.b.
158. The Municipalities Financial Recovery Act 2013 Task Force Report was
prepared by the "Local Government Commission, a legislative service agency, providing
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this provision creates an eight-year limitation on participation.1 59
Because the Task Force found that Act 47's effectiveness was weakened
by both its unlimited cap on participation and the Commonwealth's static
amount of power throughout a municipality's participation, 160 distressed
municipalities now face greater state control after the expiration of this
eight-year participation. 161 Specifically, the municipality faces state
receivership as provided for under Section 7 of Act 47.162
As discussed within the Municipalities Financial Recovery Act
2013 Task Force Report, municipalities often languish within the
program after some initial stabilizing success because they are either
"nonviable" or are hamstrung by labor-related issues such as "poor labor
negotiations on the part of the municipality, unwillingness of labor
163
unions to reach contract agreements, or adverse arbitration decisions."'
In the case of non-viable communities, which are either aware or
unaware of this reality, the timeline offers an exit strategy for such
municipalities after the initial five-year period. For instance, if the
recovery coordinator finds that the municipality remains distressed at the
end of the initial five-year participation period, he is now charged with
64
recommending the disincorporation of the nonviable municipality.
Because such a recommendation is fraught with negative political
consequences, 16 imposing a participation time limit largely removes the
temptation of inaction and forces both the municipal leaders and
recovery coordinator to make the difficult, and likely unpopular,
recommendation of disincorporation.
In cases in which negative labor relations hinder a municipality's
exit from the Act 47 program, the 2014 participation time limit has the
similar effect of forcing the politically unpalatable result of compromise.
Because both the municipal leaders and the city's labor union leaders
fear the loss of local autonomy to state receivership, a participation time
limit forces both parties to sacrifice short-term political wins in favor of
It, therefore,
political compromise benefitting the municipality.
constitutes positive reform of the struggling program.
the Members of the Pennsylvania General Assembly with research and analysis on
matters affecting local government." See 2013 TASK FORCE REPORT ON ACT 47 OF 1987,
supranote 96, at ii.
159. For a full explanation of the 2014 reform imposing a time limit on Act 47
participation, see supraPart II.D.2.b.2.
160.

See 2013 TASK FORCE REPORT ON ACT 47 OF 1987, supra note 96, at 25.

161. See supra Part II.D.2.b.2.
162. See id.
163. See 2013 TASK FORCE REPORT ON ACT 47 OF 1987, supra note 96, at 26.
164. See supra Part II.D.2.b.2.
165. See 2013 TASK FORCE REPORT ON ACT 47 OF 1987, supra note 96, at 27 (noting
the research of Gerald Cross of Pennsylvania Economy League who found that "citizens
view local government as the most personal level of government").

2015]

TRAPPED IN DISTRESS: HOW THE ACT 47 PROGRAM IS FAILING

613

2. Analysis of the New Tax Options
Also included within the 2014 reform legislation is a provision
allowing for municipal leaders to triple the Local Services Tax imposed
on those working within the distressed municipality. 166 However,
municipalities using this new revenue source are prohibited from
simultaneously raising their earned income tax rate or imposing a tax on
non-resident workers. 167 Furthermore, because the additional tax revenue
comes from a previously established income source, the tax increase
could in fact result in less revenue for distressed municipalities.168 This
decrease in revenue would result from businesses moving out of the
distressed municipality in search of a more employee-friendly tax
situation. 69 Therefore, because the consequences of this new revenue
option are questionable, this specific provision fails to embody the
drastic reform needed to ensure the program's success.

3. Analysis of the Early Intervention Program
The 2014 reform legislation also contains provisions that create a
process for dismissing ineffective recovery coordinators17 and an Early
Intervention Program for municipalities at risk of financial distress. 171
The Early Intervention program, with its grant program for studies
concerning the regionalization of services and municipal consolidation,
is promising at keeping municipalities out of the Act 47 program because
it orients them toward addressing underlying structural problems. This
Early Intervention Program, however, offers little benefit to
municipalities that are already declared financially distressed under the
Act 47 program. In the 19 municipalities currently participating, early
intervention is no longer possible, and the underlying drivers of financial
distress, which the Early Intervention program attempts to address, have
already taken hold.

166. See supra Part II.D.2.b.3.
167. See Ryan Brown, Local Services Tax Increase Put into Question, ALTOONA
MIRROR
(Sept.
7,
2014),
http://www.
altoonaiirror.com/page/content.detail/id/593148/Local-services-tax-increase-put-intoquestion.html?nav=742.
168. See Scorsone, supra note 2, at 24 (finding that, although officials often assume
higher tax rates will lead to more revenue, the increase often drives households and
businesses to relocate and leaves the government in an even greater financial hole).
169. See id.
170. See supra Part II.D.2.b. 1.
171. See supra Part II.D.2.b.4.
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C. Recommendationfor FurtherLegislative Modification
While the Pennsylvania Legislature has answered the call to amend
the Act 47 program since the City of Scranton decision, reform has failed
to produce a program capable of alleviating municipal distress.
Specifically, although a few of the 2014 reforms were substantial, they
still failed to address the underlying and long-recognized causes of
municipal distress. Therefore, in order to prevent future litigation and
ensure Act 47's success, more legislative reform is needed to fulfill the
public policy of Act 47 and involve all stakeholders in municipal
recovery as the City of Scranton dissent urged.
In order to ensure lasting reform, the legislature must specifically
address: (1) the crippling effect that the growth of tax-exempt property
has had on distressed municipalities, (2) the growing municipal public
pension crisis and its negative ramifications for municipalities and
beneficiaries alike, and (3) the need for greater regionalization of public
services and intergovernmental cooperation to address the decline of
population within distressed cities. By acting on these issues, the
legislature can finally stop nibbling around the comers of real reform and
provide municipal leaders and recovery coordinators alike with the tools
to allow municipalities to successfully exit the Act 47 program outside of
the state receivership provision.
1. Tax Reform for Non-Profit Entities
In distressed municipalities, non-profit entities' tax-exempt status
removes a significant source of property tax revenue. For example, in
the Act 47 cities of Harrisburg and Johnstown, non-profit entities own
172
nearly half the distressed municipalities' assessed property value.
Because many of the distressed municipalities participating in Act 47 had
predominantly manufacturing or steel-centric industries, 173 the growth of
non-profits such as hospitals and universities represents a transition to a
service-oriented economy. This transition often results in non-profit
institutions expanding and taking formerly revenue-generating property
off the municipal tax rolls. 174 With their tax base now eroded, distressed
municipalities are forced to pass the burden of making up such loss onto
their remaining city residents, non-resident workers, and businesses
remaining within the city. This increased tax burden on a limited set of

172. See 2013 TASK FORCE REPORT ON ACT 47 OF 1987, supra note 96, at 29.
173. See Gannon, supra note 18, at 281.
174. See, e.g., Jim Lockwood, As University of Scranton Expands, So Does Tension,
TIMES-TRIBUNE (Dec. 13, 2013), http://thetimes-tribune~com/news/as-university-ofscranton-expands-so-does-tension- 1.1590681.
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stakeholders has the potential to both drive citizens and businesses from
distressed municipalities and create an economic development crisis. 175
With both fiscal and economic development consequences for
distressed municipalities, 176 this erosion of property tax revenue was
specifically mentioned in the Municipalities Financial Recovery Act
2013 Task Force Report, which recommended creating a "state funding
source to municipalities that have a high percentage of tax-exempt
property within their municipal borders."' 77 Despite this proposal and
the recognition by former Governor Ed Rendell that tax-exempt entities
are "the single biggest problem" facing Pennsylvania's municipalities,' 78
the issue of property tax reform for non-profit entities went unaddressed
in the 2014 reform legislation. This omission is likely the result of the
state's own fiscal woes and the difficulty of "finding a dedicated source
of state funding."'' 79 If the state cannot reserve funds for municipalities
to offset the revenue lost from the tax exempt status of non-profit
entities, then the legislature could narrow the property tax exemption for
non-profits or more strictly enforce the existing exemption by ensuring
non-profits continue to meet eligibility requirements. 80 The latter
solution would have no effect on the state budget and would
simultaneously ensure both a new source of revenue and reduced
pressure on other municipal stakeholders. 18'
Unfortunately, the
Pennsylvania Legislature failed to adopt an above listed alternative in the
2014 reform legislation and thus, once again, left Act 47 participants
without the tools to cure distress.
2. Comprehensive Municipal Pension Reform
A second cause of distress requiring remedy among Act 47
participants is the combination of high personnel costs for current
175.
176.

See Scorsone, supra note 2, at 24.
See generally Susan Svrluga, Strugglingfor Revenue, Local Governments Look
2013),
Nonprofits,
WASHINGTON
POST
(Dec.
22,
to
http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/ struggling-for-revenue-local-governments-lookto-nonprofits/2013/12/22/aa334194-5e8b- 11e3-95c2-13623eb2boelstory.html
(explaining that governments around the country are re-examining their tax policy
concerning non-profit entities in the face of revenue shortfalls).
177.

See 2013 TASK FORCE REPORT ON ACT 47 OF 1987, supranote 96, at 44.

178.

See

PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS,

THE STATE ROLE IN LOCAL

GOVERNMENT

FINANCIAL DISTRESS 32 (2013).

179. See 2013 TASK FORCE REPORT ON ACT 47 OF 1987, supra note 96, at 44 (quoting
the explanation of Task force member Representative Ross as to the likelihood of
achieving such a reform).
180. See Daphne A. Kenyon and Adam H. Langley, Abstract, The Property Tax
Exemptionfor Non-Profits and Revenue Implicationsfor Cities, URBAN INSTITUTE (Dec.
9, 2011), http://www.urban.org/publications/412460.html.
181. See id.
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employees and the legacy costs of retiree benefits. Arguing that state
law "has tipped in favor of organized labor in arbitration awards and
public pension... benefits," the Pew Charitable Trusts' report
concerning states' role in easing financial distress states that
Pennsylvania will likely see the continued growth of municipal distress if
the legislature does not address the proliferation of unfunded pension
liabilities. 18 2 For example, in the Act 47 City of Scranton, a recent audit
of the city's pension funds by the state auditor general revealed the
firefighter, police, and non-uniform pension funds will be unable to make
scheduled payments in 2.5, 2.6, and 5 years, respectively. 8 3 Because
Scranton and other cities would be obligated to make pension payments
from their operating budget in the event of a shortfall, the widespread
distress of municipal pension funds is alarming and poses a serious
financial risk. While the City of Scranton may be an outlier as to the
problem's severity, the state as a whole has 7.7 billion dollars in
underfunded pension liabilities. 8 4 This figure is so striking that
Pennsylvania Auditor General Eugene DePasquale warned that many
which would unilaterally
municipalities could be forced into bankruptcy,
1 85
cut retiree's benefits and reduce city services.
Although consolidating Pennsylvania's 3,200 municipal pension
plans 186 is the ultimate goal for some advocates like State Auditor
General Eugene DePasquale, 187 the Municipalities Financial Recovery
Act 2013 Task Force Report suggested that Act 47 itself should be
amended to address all personnel costs by "allow[ing] municipalities to
cap [costs] based on a government's ability to pay."' 188 The task force
report further endorses converting public safety retirement plans from
defined benefit 189 to the less costly defined contribution plans.' 90 In the
182. See PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supranote 178, at 31.
183. See Morgan-Besecker, supra note 86.
184. See Steve Esack & Emily Opilo, Municipal Pensions in Pennsylvania Facing a
Combined $7.7 Billion Debt, MORNING CALL (Jan. 14, 2015), http://www.mcall.
com/news/local/mc-pa-municipal-pension-crisis-20150114-story.html.
185. Seeid.
186. See Steve Esack, City and Business Leaders Callfor Reforming Police and Fire
Union Labor Law, MORNING CALL (Apr. 16, 2013), http://articles.mcall.com/2013-0416/news/mc-pa-union-arbitration-change-20130416_1_sunshine-act-arbitrators-citypolice-union.
187. See Marc Levy, Auditor General: State's pension crisis getting worse, INDIANA
GAZETTE (Jan. 15, 2015, 10:33 AM), https://www.indianagazette.com/news/reg-nationalworld/auditor-general-states-pension-crisis-getting-worse,21320607/ (explaining that a
recent push to consolidate all municipal pension plans into a statewide fund has died in
house committees).
188. See 2013 TASK FORCE REPORT ON ACT 47 OF 1987, supra note 96, at 29 (quoting
PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note. 178, at 31).
Retirement,
Guide
to
Ultimate
MONEY,
CNN
189. See
http://money.cnn.com/retirement/guide/pensionsbasics.moneymag/index.htm?iid=EL
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future, this conversion could serve to entirely eliminate under-funded
pension liability for all of Pennsylvania's municipalities and ensure more
certain retirement security for future employees. Despite the broad
recognition of this growing crisis and the strain it places on municipal
governments, the 2014 reform legislation failed to address this
substantial contributor to financial distress. Without this omission
rectified in any way, municipalities such as Scranton lack the tools to
alleviate distress within the new participation time limit.
3. Regionalization of Public Services
A third common cause of distress among Pennsylvania's
municipalities is the erosion of the tax base resulting from population
decline. Although no two distressed municipalities are identical, this
overall decline in population among distressed municipalities mainly
results from the conversion of local economies from manufacturing and
As the descent of Chester,
steel-based to service-oriented. 19 1
Pennsylvania into the Act 47 program demonstrates, the initial loss of
industry and subsequent flight of taxpayers to the suburbs can have
devastating effects on a municipality's finances. 192 Municipalities are
subsequently faced with continually declining revenue projections.
Because of political constraints, however, this decline in tax revenue
often goes unmatched in adjustments to costly municipal services.
Therefore, in order to correct this asymmetry, Act 47 should be amended
to give municipal leaders and recovery coordinators power to make
adjustments to essential municipal services.
For example, in Luzerne County, Pennsylvania, where local
municipalities created a regional police department, police unions were
actually supportive of the effort "because they saw there would be more
full-time jobs, advancement and professionalism." 193 Furthermore,
municipalities would benefit from regionalization of other services or
intergovernmental cooperation. In testimony before a Dauphin County,
Pennsylvania, panel considering regionalization, Pennsylvania Economy
League representative Joseph Boyle promised future savings for
municipalities willing to take on the difficult process of merging
(last visited Feb. 6, 2015) (explaining that a defined benefit plan, as opposed to a defined
contribution plan, promises a set payout upon retirement based on employer
contributions).
190. See 2013 TASK FORCE REPORT ON ACT 47 OF 1987, supranote 96, at 29.
191. See PEW CHARITABLE TRuSTS, supra note 178, at 30.
192. See id.
193. See Barbara Miller, RegionalizingPolice Can 'Save'PoliceDepartments,
Dauphin County Panel Told, PENNLIVE.COM (Nov. 13, 2014), http://www.pennlive.com
/mid state/index.ssf/2014/1 1/regionalizingpolice can save.html.
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services. 194 In the Municipalities Financial Recovery Act 2013 Task
Force Report, the promise of regionalization of services, or at the very
least intergovernmental cooperation, was also recognized as a "way for
more efficient and less costly government, and thus make scarce local
government resources go farther."' 195 To achieve that promise of cost
savings, the 2013 Task Force Report recommended that the state provide
distressed municipalities with incentives to engage less-distressed
municipal neighbors in intergovernmental cooperation. 196 Although
somewhat vague as worded, the 2014 reform legislation provided
funding within its Early Intervention Program for studies concerning
regionalization within at-risk municipalities.197 However, the 2014 Act
47 reform legislation neglected to include similar funding for current Act
47 participants. Because such cost-sharing is necessary to prevent the
future escalation of expenses, this omission is detrimental to Act 47's
effectiveness and should be corrected in future reform in order to save
money and provide citizens with professional and well-funded essential
services.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Although Pennsylvania's Act 47 statute is considered one of the
most aggressive responses to municipal distress among the 19 states that
have enacted such legislation, it has proven to be both politically
contentious and objectively ineffective since its passage in 1987. The
early history of Act 47 included a series of legal battles with public
safety unions culminating in 2011's City of Scranton Pennsylvania
Supreme Court decision. Dealing a devastating blow to the effectiveness
of the law, City of Scranton forced the legislature to overhaul Act 47 in
hopes of better fulfilling its policy objective of curing distress. Although
the 2014 Act 47 reform legislation undoubtedly made modest
improvements, it failed to address underlying municipal distress
causes-specifically, the growth of tax-exempt property within
municipal boundaries, the growing crisis concerning municipal public
pensions and current personnel costs, and the decline in population for
municipal participants over the course of decades. Because such widely
acknowledged structural problems were unaddressed in the 2014 reform
legislation, Act 47 participants' likelihood of successfully exiting the
program remains poor. Therefore, in order to fulfill Act 47's goal of
194. See id.
195. See 2013 TASK FORCE REPORT ON ACT 47 OF 1987, supra note 96, at 28 (quoting
a 1991 study of Act 47 conducted by the Penn State Department of Public
Administration).
196. See id.at 43.
197.

See supra Part II.D.2.b.l.
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healing Pennsylvania's distressed municipalities, the legislature must act
again, more courageously, to amend Act 47 and address the underlying
causes of financial illness.

